Government Spending and Legislative Organization:Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany by Egger, Peter & Köthenbürger, Marko
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Government Spending and Legislative Organization
Egger, Peter; Köthenbürger, Marko
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Egger, P., & Köthenbürger, M. (2010). Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-experimental
evidence from Germany. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
EPRU Working Paper Series        2010-09 
 
 
 
Economic Policy Research Unit 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26 
DK-1353 Copenhagen K 
DENMARK 
Tel: (+45) 3532 4411 
Fax: (+45) 3532 4444 
Web: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Government spending and legislative organization:  
Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany 
 
 
 
Peter Egger 
Marko Koethenbuerger 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0908-7745 
 
Government spending and legislative organization:
Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany∗
Peter Egger
ETH Zurich, CEPR and CESifo‡
Marko Koethenbuerger
University of Copenhagen and CESifo∗∗
Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence of a positive effect of council size on govern-
ment spending using a data set of 2,056 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria over
a period of 21 years. We apply a regression discontinuity design to avoid an endogeneity
bias. In particular, we exploit discontinuities in the legal rule that relates population size
of a municipality to council size to identify a causal relationship between council size and
public spending, and find a robust positive impact of council size on spending. Moreover,
we show that municipalities primarily adjust current expenditure in response to a rise in
council size.
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1 Introduction
The notion that legislative organization affects government spending features prominently in
recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy.1 One reason for an overspending bias in
the public sector as seen in the literature is the districting of political jurisdictions. The key
argument for the latter is that legislators internalize the benefit of public projects targeted at
their district, but due to cost sharing underestimate the cost of project provision. The size
of government is hence positively related to the number of legislators. The phenomenon is
frequently referred to as pork-barrel spending, the fiscal commons problem, or the law of 1/n
(see, e.g., Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson, 1981).
Empirical work on the relationship between legislature size and public spending includes
those by DelRossi and Inman (1999), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Baqir (2002), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2007), and Schaltegger and Feld (2008). The corresponding evidence relies on the
variation of governments across countries (Bradbury and Crain), across U.S. states (DelRossi
and Inman), across U.S. counties/cities (Baqir), across Swiss Cantons (Schaltegger and Feld),
or across Swedish and Finnish local governments (Pettersson-Lidbom). The data used and
methods applied in such works are as diverse as the results, pointing only partly to evidence
in favor of the pork-barrel spending hypothesis. However, there are two potential problems
with existing evidence. First, most of the contributions apply empirical methods that do
not support an identification of causal effects.2 Second, in most studies inference relied on
relatively small numbers of cases supporting identification.
We deliver causal inference of the impact of council size on government spending in an
unusually large data set, comprising relatively homogeneous municipalities in just one state
of Germany, namely Bavaria. Using data of the universe of 2,056 Bavarian municipalities
over the period 1984 to 2004, we identify a positive impact of an increase in council size
on municipality-level expenditures. The principal problem with identification is that council
size may be correlated with other variables determining expenditures. This may result in an
endogeneity bias if relevant variables that are correlated with council size are omitted. For
instance, council size may reflect the general preferences of voters for a fine-grid representation
1See, e.g., Besley and Case (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2003), and Acemoglu (2005) for a review of the
literature.
2For instance, since council size changes are relatively infrequent, identification in existing empirical studies
relies mostly on cross-sectional variation in council size. This precludes the use of panel data analysis to address
problems of endogeneity.
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in legislature. At the same time voters may want to see high levels of public spending. Hence,
council size and spending might be positively associated without any causal relationship.3
In this paper, we base causal inference upon two institutional features of the political
system in the state of Bavaria. First, in Bavaria as well as in other jurisdictions, municipali-
ties have a limited influence on their council size, because the latter is formulaically related
to population size. Second, council size is a positive but discontinuous function of a juris-
diction’s population size. Bavarian state law defines 13 thresholds that relate municipality
population size to council size. Similarly sized municipalities with a marginally smaller or
marginally larger population than the legally defined threshold have starkly different council
sizes. The law-induced, discontinuous change in council size may be up to 50%. We argue
that municipalities that are close to the threshold are randomly assigned to the right or to
the left of the threshold. The discontinuity in the formula hence constitutes a quasi-natural
experiment. A focus on municipalities in the neighborhood of thresholds enables us to draw
causal inference, i.e., to determine whether council size and government spending are causally
linked, with causality running from council size to spending.4 Our empirical results suggest
that an average municipality increases its total expenditures by about 74, 850 Euro or by
about 29, 192 Euro per new council seat when crossing a threshold.
We find a positive effect of council size on fiscal spending both in a political environment
of single-district jurisdictions (at-large systems) and in one of a mayor-council legislature.
Either political institution has been argued to be inherently exclusive towards the spending
effect of council size in previous research. In an at-large system only a single political district
exists and political candidates compete for votes from the whole population. The at-large
system hence removes the overspending bias due to geographical cost sharing. In a mayor-
council system the mayor is directly elected. The mayor will more likely internalize the
overall costs of projects and, provided the mayor has a politically strong position, the mayor
can counteract the overspending bias of council members.5 Baqir (2002) finds evidence for
3See Acemoglu (2005) for a general discussion of problems of endogeneity in empirical analysis of political
economy.
4Such an approach is referred to as regression-discontinuity design (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008, Lee,
2008, and Lee and Lemieux, 2009). It has only recently been applied in political economy. See, e.g., Dahlberg,
Lundqvist, and Mo¨rk (2008), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Lee (2008), Pettersson-Lidbom (2007, 2008),
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Finan and Ferraz (2009).
5A mayor-council system is implemented, e.g., at the municipal level in some German states and in a
number of US cities (most notably in small and large cities) - see, e.g., Svara (1990) for a review of the US
experience. The idea that a politically strong legislator imposes fiscal discipline is conceptually related to the
discussion of a “strong” finance minister in government and its effect on public debt policy (e.g., von Hagen,
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mayor-council systems to break the relationship between council size and spending in US
cities.
We further look into the financing implications of politically motivated spending hikes.
Bavarian municipalities, like other German municipalities, have some taxing authority. Tax
instruments available to municipalities are property taxes and a tax on business profits. We
find that in particular property taxes change with council size. Suggestively, municipalities
use the profit tax to compete for mobile firms and are thus reluctant to increase it to finance
politically induced spending hikes.6 As to the expenditure side, it is primarily current ex-
penditure rather than infrastructure investment which changes with the number of council
members. The finding may reflect a preference by council members for spending increases
which can be implemented in the short run.
This paper proceeds by providing a description of municipal finance and politics in Bavaria
in Section 2, followed by the empirical strategy in Section 3. The results are shown in Section
4 (baseline results) and Section 5 (robustness analysis and extensions). A summary of the
main results and some conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Municipal Finance and Politics in Bavaria
Bavaria comprises 2,056 municipalities that have a considerable degree of fiscal autonomy. On
the revenue side, they can set property taxes and a business tax. Own-source tax revenues are
approximately 55% of total (own-source plus shared, but federally determined) tax revenues
and roughly 30% of total revenues (i.e., tax revenues plus transfer income). Municipalities can
borrow to the extent that the amount of borrowing does not exceed infrastructure outlays
(Golden Rule of Public Finance). Current spending, in contrast, has to be financed by
current receipts. On the expenditure side, municipalities provide important public services
such as sports facilities, kindergartens, nursing homes, elementary schools as well as utility
and infrastructure services.
2005, 2006), and to the economic comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems (e.g., Persson and
Tabellini, 2003). A strong finance ministers most likely internalizes the overall costs of pork-barrel spending,
with the consequence of vetoing some of the expenditure proposals of cabinet ministers. In a presidential
system, the president is elected directly into office and has independent authority (both equally apply to
mayors in Bavaria). By contrast, in a parliamentary system the prime minister is elected by the parliament
and is accountable to it.
6The finding is consistent with the basic prediction of the literature on fiscal competition which is that
competing jurisdictions will generically abstain from financing additional spending by taxing mobile resources
such as capital or firms - see, e.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and Sinn (2003).
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Municipalities have the right of self-management. The municipal political system in
Bavaria is a mayor-council system (the so-called Su¨ddeutsche Ratsverfassung).7 The system
features direct elections of the mayor and council members (mayor-council system), which are
held every six years. The mayor has a strong position in municipal politics, being the chief
executive of the municipality who is solely responsible for its operation. The mayor is also
a chairman of the council, endowed with voting rights and the prerogative to veto actions of
the council (in particular of subcommittees implemented by the council).8
The legislature comprises candidates of national parties and candidates who have no affil-
iation with national parties, and independent candidates may be politically organized either
on a stand-alone basis or may have joined a voter association. An important feature of the
political system is that the council size is related to the population size of the municipalities.9
Table 1 summarizes the mapping of population size into council size as prescribed by law.
There are 13 council sizes where the council size in the cities of Munich and Nuremberg is
directly prescribed by law. Otherwise, the council size is formulaically related to the popu-
lation size of the municipality at a specific date (determined by law) prior to the election.
In particular, the number of legislators elected in the years 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2002 de-
pended on the population size in the third quarter of the year prior to the election. Hence,
the size of 2,063 out of 2,065 councils is formulaically determined by the population size, thus
representing a sharp assignment of municipalities to council size in Bavaria.
insert Table 1 here
The data we use comprise fiscal data on spending and revenues, data on population size,
and data on the size of municipal councils. The municipal data come from the Bavarian
statistical office and are publicly available.10 Table 2 may help gathering some impression
of the distribution of observations across different council size levels. Almost 91 percent of
the data refer to municipalities with a pre-election-year population size not exceeding 20,000
inhabitants and, hence, with a council size of 24 seats or less.
7Interestingly, after WWII the military government in the British occupation zone (comprising the northern
states of former West Germany) implemented a council-manager system, in which the mayor was elected by
the council and accountable to it (the so-called Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung). Recently, these states have
gradually transitioned to a mayor-council system. The expenditure effects of the political reform are analyzed
in Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007).
8See http://www.stmi.bayern.de/service/gesetze/ for more information (in German).
9The relevant population metric only comprises individuals who have their first place of residence in the
respective municipalities. Hence, an individual may not be registered to reside in more than one municipality.
10See http://www.statistik.bayern.de/.
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insert Table 2 here
The last two columns of Table 2 show total public expenditure and per-capita public
expenditure over the sample period. Expenditures increase by council size, which per se
does not allow the inference of any causal relationship between council size and government
spending. Because council size is formulaically related to population size, Table 2 may display
a spurious correlation. The rise in expenditures with council size may reflect a higher demand
for public spending following a rise in population size, yielding higher total amount and per-
capita values of public spending. The former response is straightforward. The latter is
consistent with the “Brecht Law” which stipulates that a higher concentration of population
raises per-capita spending due to, e.g., increased crowding in the consumption of public
services.11 Disentangling the effect of population size from other causes of spending growth
such as legislative organization is a non-trivial task in empirical analysis (see Acemoglu, 2005).
In our empirical analysis we address that concern by employing a regression-discontinuity
design as explained in the next section.
3 Empirical strategy
As mentioned above, the focus in this paper is on the causal impact of council size on
the amount of expenditures at the municipality level.12 In our case, council size is a step
function which discontinuously maps population size onto council size. The key problem of
identifying the causal effect of council size on expenditures is to discern the discontinuous
relationship between log population size and log expenditures through discrete changes in
council size as suggested by Table 1 from a continuous relationship between log population
and log expenditures. Proper inference should obey endogeneity of council size along with
its discontinuity about population size.
Ideally, causal inference relies on a randomized design or experiment, where the number
of legislators is changed randomly across municipalities. Such an experiment is not available
11In the online appendix we provide a scatter plot of total log expenditure and per-capita log expenditure of
municipalities over the sample period. As one may expect, the distribution is somewhat skewed towards smaller
municipalities (and, consequently, council sizes), and total log expenditures as well as total log expenditures
per capita rise in population size.
12Subsequently, we use total public expenditures as the dependent variable. As shown by Primo and Snyder
(2008), a rise in the number of legislators may not necessarily increase the size of the expenditure package each
legislator proposes. This, for instance, prevails for pure public goods. However, even with this type of public
expenditure the rise in the number of legislators in itself raises total public spending. It is the combined effect
of legislature size on the intensive and extensive margin of public spending which is put to a test here.
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for municipality council size and its impact on municipality expenditures. However, one may
adopt a quasi-experimental design to approximate real randomization. In particular, with
the discontinuous relationship of population size to council size, application of a regression-
discontinuity-design (RDD) seems natural (see Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Van der Klaauw,
2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; in particular, Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008, and Lee and Lemieux, 2009, provide a very useful guide for practitioners).
In our application, the nexus between population size and council size entails a sharp design.
Hence, assignment of municipalities to different council sizes in election years (such as 1984,
1990, 1996, and 2002) and five years thereafter is solely determined by population size in the
years prior to the elections (i.e., 1983, 1989, 1995, 2001).
Let us describe the RDD model in formal accounts for a cross-section of data around a
single discontinuity d as follows.13 First, let us refer to population size for any municipality i
by Ni, to critical population size at the threshold by Nd, and to normalized population size
by N˜i ≡ Ni/Nd. Then, ln N˜i = 0 at a population size of Ni = Nd, i.e., at the threshold.
Then, we can define an indicator variable for observations i as
Di =
{
1 if ln N˜i > 0
0 if ln N˜i ≤ 0
(1)
The RDD model for observations i may be formulated as
ln G˜i = α+ βDi + k(N˜i) + ...+ εi, (2)
where ln G˜i is the logarithm of normalized (i.e., centered around the threshold) expenditures
of municipality i, k(·) is a polynomial function of ln N˜i which is supposed to capture the
continuous relationship between ln N˜i and ln G˜i. α is a constant, β corresponds to a dis-
continuous effect of council size at Ni = Nd, and εi is a disturbance term. Inference about
the regression discontinuity at ln N˜i = 0 for all i can be made by means of local polynomial
regression plots where the polynomial function about population size, k(·), is based upon a
kernel smoothing algorithm (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2009). In the benchmark analysis,
13In our case, several discontinuities: d = 1, ..., 13, where d = 1 is associated with a council size of 8, d = 2
corresponds to a council size of 12, and so on, and d = 13 corresponds to a council size of 80 (see Table 1 for
the different size classes). As illustrated by Table 1, the critical population sizes at which discrete changes
in council size occur are 1, 000, 2, 000, 3, 000, 5, 000, 10, 000, 20, 000, 30, 000, 50, 000, 100, 000, 200, 000, and
300, 000 inhabitants, respectively. As indicated by Table 1, Nuremberg and Munich have specific council
sizes independent of their population. Below, we will normalize population sizes and total expenditures such
that the data are centered around a singe threshold and we can estimate the average treatment effect for all
discontinuities.
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we employ an Epanechnikov kernel smoother for k(·) in equation (2), where the optimal
bandwidth is determined endogenously. In our robustness analysis we also use alternative
kernel smoothing algorithms and bandwidths.
To estimate the regression discontinuity β and, hence, the causal impact of a change in
council size at the threshold ln N˜i = 0, one may use all data as suggested by equations (1) and
(2) or data within a more narrowly defined window only. Using data only within a certain
window around ln N˜i = 0 exhibits the advantage that mis-specification of the functional form
of the polynomial is less likely than when using all data (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009).14
We will return to the issue in more detail in the next section.
4 Benchmark results
Our data-set covers log expenditures and council size of 2,063 municipalities in Bavaria be-
tween 1984 and 2004 where the council size is determined by the population size in the year
prior to the election year. Figures 1 and 2 show local polynomial regression plots of log
normalized population ln N˜i and log normalized total expenditures ln G˜i of all municipalities
to the right and the left of the population thresholds in the data. In general, the data points
are represented by local averages in ln N˜i-space.15
insert Figures 1 and 2 here
Figure 1 applies a window size of ±0.15 so that only observations in the interval ln N˜i ∈
[−0.15, 0.15] are included. Figures 2 uses a window size of ±0.30.16 Notice that the latter
is relatively large, given the distance between the different population thresholds. For local
polynomial smoothing – referred to as k(·) in equation (2) – we apply an Epanechnikov kernel
with an endogenously determined bandwidth.
Figures 1 and 2 suggest the following conclusions. There are enough data points available
for identification even within a window of ±0.15 around ln N˜i = 0. The discontinuity amounts
to approximately 0.10. The polynomial function is less nonlinear with a smaller window.
insert Table 3 here
14Another advantage relates to problems with more than one threshold as ours: using data only within a
certain window ensures that observations appear only once in the window for a single threshold d.
15Hence, each data point represents an average value of ln G˜i for values of ln N˜i in a certain interval.
16Regression plots with intermediate window sizes (±0.20 and ±0.25) can be found in the online appendix.
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Let us summarize the information contained in Figures 1 and 2 in a different way by means
of estimates of the regression discontinuities in Table 3. Therein, we also report results for
alternative window sizes of 0.20 and 0.25. The table additionally provides information on
the average number of observations to the left and to the right of ln N˜i = 0 for each chosen
window, and on the average change in the number of council seats when crossing ln N˜i = 0
from the left. Similar to Figures 1 and 2, we allow for different parameters of the local
polynomial function to the right and to the left of ln N˜i = 0. In general, we use a third-order
polynomial in Table 3. At the bottom of the table, we report the p-values of F-tests about
the joint significance of the third-order, the second- and third-order, and all polynomial terms
together.
Most importantly, point estimates of the magnitude of the discontinuities are provided
along with their standard errors in the table. We correct the variance-covariance matrix
of the parameters for clustering, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form
throughout. We should note that using a third-order polynomial is more than enough with
a window of ±0.15. Higher order polynomial terms tend to display smaller p-values with
larger windows. Hence, mis-specification of the polynomial function is more likely with
larger windows.17 The results in Table 3 suggest that municipality expenditures increase by
approximately 11 percent (or 4 percentage points per council seat) when crossing the average
threshold from below (see the results in the first column of Table 3 with a window of ±0.15).
According to Table 1, average municipality expenditures amount to about 654, 928 Euro per
municipality. The point estimate of Table 3 suggests that an average municipality increases
its total expenditures by about 654, 928 · (exp(0.108) − 1) ' 74, 850 Euro or about 29, 192
Euro per new council seat when crossing a threshold from below.
5 Robustness analysis and extensions
Among the options of checking the robustness of the results, the choice of the kernel and,
even more so, the bandwidth for the kernel smoothing algorithm of the local polynomial
regressions are particularly important. Let us use Figure 1 as a reference point. There,
we use an Epanechnikov kernel with an endogenously chosen bandwidth and a window of
±0.15 around ln N˜i = 0. In our first robustness analysis, we use the same window and
17Some efficiency could be gained by using a second-order polynomial function with a window of ±0.15, but
we suppress the corresponding results for the sake of brevity.
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an endogenously determined bandwidth for a Gaussian, a Triangular, and a Parzen kernel,
respectively. In a second analysis, we return to an Epanechnikov kernel, but choose a fixed
bandwidth of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.02.18 The alternative specifications provide a qualitatively
similar result as the one shown in Figure 1 and 2. The corresponding figures are available in
the online appendix.
As a further robustness check we test for evidence of placebo effects in the vicinity of
ln N˜i = 0 in Figures 1 and 2. In particular, we allow for placebo treatments to the left (-0.06
and -0.035) and to the right (+0.06 and +0.035) of ln N˜i = 0. These placebo treatments
are useful to shed light on the question of whether significant regression discontinuities at
legal thresholds are artifacts because similar discontinuities are found in their vicinity as well.
Table 4 shows the regression results at the placebo thresholds which are all insignificant at
conventional levels.19 Hence, we can interpret the statistical significance of the discontinuity
at the actual thresholds as an indication of a causal effect of council size on expenditures.
insert Table 4 here
Two interesting issues that remain to be considered are which expenditure type and
revenue category predominantly responds to a rise in political spending demand. Table 5
shows results for the two main current expenditure categories (personnel expenditure and
material spending) and for investment expenditure. The effect on current expenditure is
larger in magnitude and is also statistically significant at a lower level. Suggestively, council
size members are impatient with respect to the timing of spending hikes and, hence, prefer
expenditure adjustments which can be implemented in the short run.
insert Table 5 here
At this point one may wonder to what extent the increase in personnel expenditure is
mechanically related to the direct cost of council members. The magnitude of the effect is
much higher than the direct cost associated with a rise in the number of legislators. Council
members are not employed by the municipality. Their political office is on an honorary basis
and the allowance they receive is modest, not seldomly only about 100 EUR per month.
18Even using an inadequate bandwidth of 0.5 would lead to a similar qualitative conclusion, but of a
somewhat smaller treatment effect of approximately 8 percent.
19The corresponding graphs are relegated to the online appendix. See Figures 13 to 16.
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Municipalities with a population of 10,000 and more can employ full-time civil servants
(Referenten) which are part of the council, but have no voting right. Their remuneration
depends on the population size and changes at population thresholds 15,000, 30,000, 50,000
and 100,000. To test whether the change in remuneration is responsible for the identified
change in personnel expenditure, we have restricted the data set to municipalities with less
than 10,000 inhabitants which are 76 percent of all municipalities. Repeating the analysis
with a window of ±0.15 yields an effect on log personnel expenditure of 0.132 which is
significant at the 1 percent level. That result is similar to the one reported for the universe
of municipalities in Table 5.
As to the revenue side, municipalities can issue debt and set tax instruments indepen-
dently. There are three types of tax rates municipalities can determine: taxes on agricultural
land (Property Tax A), on business and private land (Property Tax B) and on business
profits.
insert Table 6 here
As shown in Table 6, property tax rates change significantly on average with council size,
while the profit tax reacts less than the property taxes, both in magnitude and statistical
significance. Presumably, municipalities use profit taxes as the prime instrument to compete
for mobile firms. They may hence be reluctant to increase the profit tax burden on mobile
firms (see Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; and Sinn, 2003).20 Differences in debt financing
across council size classes are not highly significant. Municipalities do not predominantly
finance higher council size-induced expenditures by raising debt, a finding that somehow
contrasts with predictions of political economy models of legislative decision-making (see,
e.g., von Hagen, 2006). The finding is, however, consistent with the budgetary legislation
municipalities face. Higher public debt levels are only feasible to the extent that investment
expenditures increase at the same amount (so called Golden Rule of Public Finance). Table
4 shows that this expenditure category reacts only mildly in terms of statistical significance.
20The prediction of the tax competition literature is of particular relevance at the municipal level where
firms can avoid taxes at relatively low cost (as compared with cross-national tax avoidance) by relocating
economic activities to neighboring municipalities.
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6 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence for a positive effect of council size on government spending.
We use panel data of 2,056 municipalities over a period of 21 years and a quasi-experimental
design to identify the causal effects of a change in municipality council size on spending. The
quasi-experimental design rests upon discontinuities in the legal rule that relates population
size to the number of council members.
Interestingly, we find a positive effect of council size on fiscal spending in a political envi-
ronment of single-district jurisdictions (at-large systems) and of a mayor-council legislature.
Both political institutions are argued to be inherently exclusive towards the spending effect of
council size in previous literature. Furthermore, among the set of available financing options
municipalities primarily rely on property taxes rather than profit taxes and public debt to
finance council size-related spending hikes.
The results have implications for the policy discussion of how to restrain the pro-spending
bias inherent to legislature size. A frequently voiced recommendation is to introduce a
“strong” legislator (i.e., a legislator who is endowed with a wide range of authority; pos-
sibly including a veto right). The recommendation is akin to a mayor-council system for
which we still find a quantitatively important impact of the number of legislators on spend-
ing. Our results also suggest that legislators might perceive a higher political cost of financing
pork-barrel expenditure by taxes on mobile resources such as a profit tax. From that per-
spective, exposing municipalities to fiscal competition undermines legislators’ incentive to
unhesitatingly approve each others spending proposals.
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Council size
0 < pop <= 1000 8
1000 < pop <= 2000 12
2000 < pop <= 3000 14
3000 < pop <= 5000 16
5000 < pop <= 10000 20
10000 < pop <= 20000 24
20000 < pop <= 30000 30
30000 < pop <= 50000 40
50000 < pop <= 100000 44
100000 < pop <= 200000 50
200000 < pop <= 500000 60
Nueremberg 70
Munich 80
Population size (pop)
Table 1: Council size as a discontinuous function of population size
mn. Euro Euro
8 4.032 1,3 1.511,11
12 13.671 2,3 1.516,25
14 7.304 3,8 1.504,63
16 8.115 6,1 1.531,17
20 6.033 11,3 1.589,51
24 2.850 22,8 1.621,28
30 492 38,1 1.571,05
40 318 78,9 1.981,20
44 210 142,0 2.254,15
50 87 301,0 2.562,88
60 21 559,0 2.185,36
70 21 1.330,0 2.729,53
80 21 4.190,0 3.404,98
Notes:  The regression discontinuity design is sharp.
Table 2 - Observations, total expenditures, and per-capita expenditures across council size
classes in Bavaria (2,056 municipalities over the period 1984-2004).
Total expenditures
Per-capita 
expenditures Council size 
(seats)
Number of 
observations
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Figure 1 - Log expenditures and log population
around normalized thresholds
window=15%, Epanechnikov kernel
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Table 3 - The effect of council size on total municipal expenditure
Explanatory variable
Treatment: council size to the right versus to the left of a threshold in election year t 0,108 ** 0,121 *** 0,149 *** 0,195 ***
0,052 0,045 0,041 0,022
Implied increase in seats (from below to above threshold)
    Average increase in number of seats 2,56 2,32 2,20 2,02
    Average increase in percent 18,21 16,28 15,35 13,98
Observations
    Total within window around population threshold 22.604 29.768 37.157 44.276
    Total within window below population threshold 10.914 14.499 18.288 21.858
    Total within window above population threshold 11.690 15.269 18.869 22.418
Joint significance of log population polynomial terms (p-value of F-statistics)
    First-order, second-order, and third-order terms together 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000
    Second-order and third-order terms together 0,013 0,000 0,000 0,000
    Third-order terms only 0,170 0,003 0,002 0,000
Window size around the population thresholds determining 
council size
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significantly
different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, according to two-tailed t-statistics. Third-order local polynomial regressions are estimated to
the left and the right of the threshold separately. 
± 0.15 ± 0.20 ± 0.25 ± 0.30
Table 4 - The effect of council size on total municipal expenditure - Placebo treatment (window size ± 0.20)
Explanatory variable
Treatment: council size to the right versus to the left of a placebo threshold in election year t 0,095 -0,029 -0,465 0,144
0,122 0,129 0,341 0,342
Observations
    Total within window around placebo threshold 29.768 29.768 29.768 29.768
    Total within window below placebo threshold 17.382 11.955 19.319 10.134
    Total within window above placebo threshold 12.386 17.813 10.449 19.634
Joint significance of log population polynomial terms (p-value of F-statistics)
    First-order, second-order, and third-order terms together 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
    Second-order and third-order terms together 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
    Third-order terms only 0,268 0,000 0,062 0,000
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, according to two-tailed t-statistics. Third-order local polynomial regressions are estimated to the left and the right of the
placebo threshold separately. 
Placebo threshold relative to actual threshold
0,035 -0,035 0,06 -0,06
Table 5 - The effect of council size on municipal expenditure categories (15% window of log population size around thresholds)
Explanatory variable
Treatment: council size to the right versus to the left of a threshold 0,102 * 0,141 *** 0,166 ***
0,061 0,059 0,059
Joint significance of log population polynomial terms (p-value of F-statistics)
    First-order, second-order, and third-order terms together 0,387 0,004 0,002
    Second-order and third-order terms together 0,418 0,033 0,013
   Third-order terms only 0,568 0,429 0,356
Table 6 - The effect of council size on municipal debt and tax rates (15% window of log population size around thresholds)
Explanatory variable
Treatment: council size to the right versus to the left of a threshold 0,136 * 0,055 *** 0,059 *** 0,009 **
0,074 0,009 0,008 0,004
Joint significance of log population polynomial terms (p-value of F-statistics)
    First-order, second-order, and third-order terms together 0,004 0,000 0,000 0,005
    Second-order and third-order terms together 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,004
   Third-order terms only 0,082 0,000 0,000 0,004
Outcome
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different
from zero at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to two-tailed t-statistics. Third-order local polynomial regressions are estimated to the left and the right of the
threshold separately. 
Log investment 
expenditure
Log material 
expenditure
Log personnel 
expenditure
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and clustering. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 
Outcome
Log debt
Log property tax 
rate A
Log property tax 
rate B Log profit tax rate
